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Yes, Virginia, There Is a
Confrontation Clause
Tom Lininger †
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Myrna
Raeder’s excellent scholarship 1 concerning the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Crawford v. Washington. 2 It is fitting to discuss the
Crawford decision in New York, where much of the important
litigation interpreting Crawford has taken place.
One of my favorite New Yorkers was Francis Pharcellus
Church. We all remember Mr. Church’s famous editorial for
the New York Sun newspaper in 1897. Mr. Church wrote the
piece in response to a letter from young Virginia O’Hanlon,
whose friends told her that Santa Claus was just a myth. Mr.
Church emphatically rebuked the doubters: “Virginia, your
little friends are wrong. They have been affected by the
scepticism of a sceptical age . . . . Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa
Claus.” 3
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford, like Mr.
Church’s editorial, seemed primarily concerned with rebutting
the skeptics. The majority opinion in Crawford sharply
criticized prior decisions – most notably Ohio v. Roberts 4 – that
cast doubt on the primacy of the Confrontation Clause. Just
like Mr. Church’s editorial, the Crawford majority exposed the
skeptics’ errors by arguing reductio ad absurdum: if Roberts’
teleology were acceptable, judges could dispense with jury
†
Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., Yale University).
1
Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s
Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005).
Professor Raeder is arguably the nation’s foremost authority on evidentiary issues in
prosecutions of violence against women, and her guidance has helped me tremendously
with my own scholarship on this issue.
2
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
Francis P. Church, Editorial, Is There a Santa Claus?, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 21,
1897, available at http://www.stormfax.com/virginia.htm. Church’s reply to Virginia is
“without question, the best-known newspaper editorial in American history.” Clyde
Haberman, In This House, A Little Girl Had a Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at
B1.
4
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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trials when they were confident of defendants’ guilt. 5 The
Crawford majority insisted that the Confrontation Clause is
alive and well, and is not just a figment of defendants’
imaginations.
Unfortunately, the Crawford ruling was short on
details. The Crawford majority spent more time disabusing
critics of their misconceptions about the Confrontation Clause
than announcing a clear test to replace Roberts. The lack of
concrete guidance in Crawford has led to inconsistent rulings
by the lower courts. Some courts have persisted in the
practices decried by Crawford. 6 Prosecutors are dismissing or
losing a high number of domestic violence cases, in large part
because no one is certain what Crawford really means. 7
In the 2005-06 term – one hundred years after the death
of Francis Pharcellus Church – it is time for the Supreme
Court to finish the task of vindicating the Confrontation
Clause. In particular, the Court should clarify the extent of
confrontation rights in three contexts: 1) the prosecution’s use
of verbal statements by alleged victims to responding officers;
2) the prosecution’s use of nontestimonial hearsay; and 3) the
prosecution’s introduction of hearsay under the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing. Each of these topics will be discussed
in turn below.
I.

STATEMENTS TO RESPONDING OFFICERS

Professor Raeder is generally wary of the testimonial
approach to confrontation, arguing that modern courts should
not be bound by the common law in 1791. 8 Her arguments are
cogent, but I believe that in many respects the testimonial
approach is preferable to the Roberts framework.
The
testimonial approach is more faithful to the Framers’ intent,
and in particular to their concerns about the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh. 9 The testimonial approach strengthens defendants’
5

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“Dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant
is obviously guilty.”); Church, supra note 3 (“Not believe in Santa Claus! You might as
well not believe in fairies!”).
6
See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV.
747, 766-67 (2005).
7
Id. at 750, 820 app. 1 (setting forth results of survey involving sixty
prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon and Washington; 76% of respondents reported
a higher number of dismissals after Crawford).
8
Raeder, supra note 1, at 315-16.
9
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-50.
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confrontation rights in the settings where the need for
confrontation is most urgent. Further, at least in theory, the
testimonial approach makes confrontation analysis more
predictable than under the vague Roberts test examining
“indicia of reliability.” 10
The parameters of “testimonial hearsay” are clear in
some contexts, but they are less clear in others. Currently the
most problematic issue seems to be the application of the term
“testimonial” to alleged victims’ statements to police who have
just arrived at the scene. For example, when police respond to
an emergency call at a residence where domestic violence
seems to have occurred, and the apparent victim makes a brief
statement to the police within a few minutes after their arrival,
is this statement “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford?
One possible approach would label the statement
nontestimonial because the officers are securing the scene
Such a
rather than “interrogating” the declarant. 11
classification may appear advantageous in that it offers a
bright-line temporal rule (i.e. statements are admissible if
given within a few minutes after the officers’ arrival). But I
believe this approach is unduly formalistic. Accusers who
speak to police shortly after their arrival should foresee the
prosecutorial use of their statements. Moreover, if police were
able to circumvent the Crawford test merely by asking
questions immediately after their arrival, then police might
simply commence an informal interrogation the moment they
meet the apparent victim, and ask all the crucial questions in
the first few minutes.
The stopwatch has no place in
confrontation analysis.

10

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
People v. Ford, No. A104115, 2004 WL 2538477, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
10, 2004) (determining that victim’s statements in response to officers’ preliminary
questions at scene of domestic violence were nontestimonial because officers were
“eliciting basic facts about the nature and cause of her injuries”); People v. Magdeleno,
No. B169360, 2004 WL 2181412, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2004) (holding that a
statement by domestic violence victim when she first encountered police was not
testimonial because no “structured police questioning” had occurred); People v.
Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873-74 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (finding that a statement by
domestic violence victim in response to preliminary questioning by police during field
investigation was nontestimonial); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 609-610 n.4
(Tex. App. 2004) (stating that investigatory questioning immediately after commission
of a crime does not constitute “interrogation” so Crawford is inapplicable). See Mungo
v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting, in dictum, that assault
victim’s “answers to the early questions, delivered in emergency circumstances to help
the police nab [victim’s] assailant,” were not testimonial).
11
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Another possible approach would be to treat all excited
utterances as necessarily nontestimonial. According to this
view, a battered woman who speaks to a police officer shortly
after the battery is so overwhelmed by the trauma of the event
that she does not contemplate the later use of her statements
in a criminal prosecution. The categorical approach to excited
utterances has attracted a number of adherents. 12 I agree with
Professor Raeder that such a rule is too drastic. 13 The
Crawford majority’s criticism of White v. Illinois 14 suggests that
the Court does not favor such liberal admission of excited
In addition, a statement does not lose its
utterances. 15
testimonial character merely because the declarant was excited
at the time of the statement. 16 Excited declarants can foresee
that prosecutors will use their statements.
Indeed,
confrontation of an excited declarant may be more important
than confrontation of a dispassionate declarant because the
former is more likely to fabricate or exaggerate details out of
spite toward the assailant.
A third possible approach would consider, on a case-bycase basis, a range of factors that distinguish testimonial from
nontestimonial statements. These factors might include the
following: 1) the formality of the setting; 2) whether the
communication was recorded; and 3) whether the officers
12

United States v. Brown, 322 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 n.4 (D. Mass. 2004)
(expressing doubt that “Crawford would apply to spontaneous utterances”); State v.
Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 209-11 (Me. 2004) (describing how defendant’s mother drove to
police station and, while “sobbing and crying,” gave a statement about defendant’s
assault on her earlier that day; the court found that the statement qualified as an
excited utterance and was nontestimonial under Crawford analysis); State v. Wright,
686 N.W.2d 295, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that declarants’ “demonstrated
emotional distress – the very quality that justified the admission of their statements as
excited utterances – is inconsistent with a determination that they were made with a
belief that such statements ‘would be available for use at a later trial’”) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(statements were nontestimonial when victim spoke spontaneously and she was
“nervous, shaking, and crying”), aff’d, 607 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. 2005); State v. Banks, No.
03AP-1286, 2004 WL 2809070, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004) (Crawford does not
apply to excited utterances), appeal denied, 825 N.E.2d 624, and 830 N.E.2d 348 (Ohio
2005); Rivera v. State, No. 04-03-00830-CR, 2004 WL 3015165, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Dec.
30, 2004) (mem.) (excited utterance to responding officers was not testimonial).
13
Raeder, supra note 1, at 335.
14
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
15
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
16
Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In our
view, the findings necessary to support a conclusion that a statement was an excited
utterance do not conflict with those that are necessary to support a conclusion that it
was testimonial . . . . [T]he statement does not lose its character as a testimonial
statement merely because the declarant was excited at the time it was made.”).
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announced they had a particular suspect in mind. 17 Professor
Raeder seems to advocate a case-by-case approach, and I agree
with her that the multifactor approach is preferable to the two
categorical approaches discussed above. 18 On the other hand,
the multifactor standard is unpredictable, and results could
vary from court to court. Two courts faced with identical facts
might ascribe different significance to the same fact, as in the
Roberts era. 19
Perhaps a fourth approach deserves consideration.
Statements to police officers could be treated as presumptively
testimonial, so long as the declarant knew she was speaking
with a police officer. The presumption could be rebutted if the
prosecution could make a strong showing that the
characteristics of nontestimonial statements predominated
over the characteristics of testimonial statements.
This
approach might combine the advantages of a multifactor test
with the greater predictability of a categorical rule. Critics
might complain that the presumption would result in the loss
of many victims’ statements, but exclusion need not necessarily
result. The classification of evidence as testimonial would
simply require that the prosecution afford the accused an
opportunity for confrontation, possibly at a pretrial hearing or
deposition.
II.

NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY

I agree with Professor Raeder that one of Crawford’s
greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify confrontation
requirements for nontestimonial hearsay. 20 Many lower courts
have avoided the Crawford test by classifying the hearsay at
issue as nontestimonial. Indeed, in the nine months between
the date of the Crawford ruling and the end of 2004, lower
courts issued hundreds of rulings interpreting Crawford, and
approximately one-third of the rulings that reached the merits
determined that the evidence at issue was nontestimonial. 21
Those courts deeming hearsay to be nontestimonial have
generally applied Roberts and its progeny – a great irony given
17
See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856-57 (Ct. App. 2004)
(stressing formality and setting, among other factors), review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal.
2004).
18
Raeder, supra note 1, at 331.
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
20
Raeder, supra note 1, at 316-17.
21
Lininger, supra note 6, at 766-67.
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the Crawford majority’s vehement criticism of Roberts.
Because the opinions following Roberts, especially Inadi and
White, 22 have rendered the confrontation analysis perfunctory
for firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions, the application of the
Roberts test is tantamount to applying no confrontation test at
all.
What would be a better test for nontestimonial hearsay?
One attractive alternative is the approach taken by Oregon
courts. Even before Crawford, the Oregon Supreme Court
recognized the danger in dispensing with confrontation
analysis for hearsay fitting within a firmly-rooted exception.
In Oregon v. Moore, 23 the court declined to follow Inadi, White,
and the other progeny of Roberts that rendered confrontational
analysis co-extensive with statutory hearsay law. The Oregon
Supreme Court required the prosecution to demonstrate the
unavailability of the declarant or to produce the declarant for
cross-examination, whether or not the prosecution invoked a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception. 24 This requirement helps to
avoid the gamesmanship of the pre-Crawford era, when
prosecutors called police to recount victims’ hearsay statements
even when the victims were available to testify. 25
If Roberts continues to supply the confrontation test for
nontestimonial hearsay, police will likely modify their practices
so that they elicit statements in settings that do not trigger the
strictures of Crawford.
The efficacy of defendants’
confrontation will then depend on officers’ skill in avoiding the
label “testimonial.” 26 The protection of the Sixth Amendment
should not be vulnerable to such manipulation. It is time for
the Supreme Court to close the gap between confrontation
rights for testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay.

22
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (finding that government
may offer co-conspirator’s statement without showing unavailability of declarant);
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not
require proof of unavailability when government offers hearsay under exceptions for
excited spontaneous declarations and for statements made to obtain medical
treatment).
23
49 P.3d 785 (Or. 2002).
24
Id. at 792.
25
See, e.g., Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
the pre-Crawford trial court had allowed the prosecution to offer hearsay statements
against the accused even though the declarant was available to testify), abrogated by
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
26
See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (expressing concern
that officers will be able to manipulate factors that distinguish testimonial from
nontestimonial hearsay).
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In the wake of Crawford, some prosecutors are
attempting to avoid confrontation requirements entirely by
invoking the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
This
doctrine extinguishes the confrontation rights of a party who
has wrongfully procured the absence of the hearsay declarant. 27
Dicta in Crawford expressly approved the forfeiture doctrine. 28
Adam Krischer of the American Prosecutors Research Institute
has gone so far as to argue that “domestic violence almost
always involves forfeiture.” 29
I support the forfeiture doctrine as a general matter, but
I worry that it will become too expansive after Crawford.
Professor Raeder has suggested some reasonable boundaries
for the doctrine: it should only apply when the opponent
actually intended to procure the declarant’s unavailability, or
when the opponent killed the declarant. 30 Mr. Krischer,
however, would transform the forfeiture doctrine into a silver
bullet that would slay Crawford in virtually any domestic
violence prosecution. Domestic violence is coercive, to be sure,
but not every assault carries with it the threat of reprisals if
the victim cooperates with law enforcement. If courts were to
presume such tampering in every domestic violence case, the
forfeiture exception would swallow the rule of confrontation.
As prosecutors rely increasingly on the forfeiture
doctrine in the aftermath of Crawford, important questions
remain to be answered. What standard of proof should apply? 31
Should all categories of statements by the victim be admissible
against the wrongdoer, or only those that relate to the
27

See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
29
Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid,
PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14, available at 38-DEC PROSC 14 (Westlaw).
30
Raeder, supra note 1, at 355.
31
Most courts have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when
judging whether the proponent has made the predicate showing to invoke the doctrine
of forfeiture of wrongdoing. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir.
2002); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271,
1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982);
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d
624, 629 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004); State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076, 1087 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003);
State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004); United States v. Melendez, No. CRIM.
96-0023, 1998 WL 737994, at *3 (D.P.R. Oct. 15, 1998); United States v. Rivera, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2003).
28
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wrongdoing? What does it mean for a party to “acquiesce” in
wrongdoing as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)?
The lower courts are beginning to hear a number of forfeiture
arguments after Crawford, but guidance from the Supreme
Court would be helpful to avoid a patchwork of conflicting
opinions. 32 Prosecutors and courts should resist the temptation
to treat the forfeiture doctrine as a panacea for all the
difficulties created by Crawford.
IV.

CONCLUSION: LESS CANT, MORE KANT

Francis Pharcellus Church lived by a simple motto:
“Endeavor to clear your mind of cant.” 33 The lower courts
interpreting Crawford would do well to follow this adage.
While courts have generally acknowledged that Crawford
requires greater respect for confrontation rights, some courts
still cling to the teleological conception of confrontation.
Notwithstanding their lip service to Crawford, these courts
seem to believe that confrontation is merely a means to the end
of ensuring the reliability of evidence, and that confrontation
rights must occasionally give way to considerations of
expediency.
A Kantian perspective would be more appropriate.
Confrontation is not a means to an end, but an end in itself.
The government must respect the defendant’s autonomy in
determining whether to confront accusers, even when the
utility of such confrontation may appear negligible in a
particular case.
The Supreme Court should clarify that when it said
confrontation, it meant confrontation. In a follow-up ruling to
Crawford, the Supreme Court should spell out what the
Confrontation Clause requires in the settings where lower
courts have ruled inconsistently. Prosecutors should focus
32
Compare State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146, at
*14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (murder of declarant did not justify finding of
forfeiture by wrongdoing where prosecutor could not show intent to prevent victim
from testifying), with People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847-48 (Ct. App. 2004),
review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the defendant forfeited
confrontation rights by murdering declarant, even where government could not show
intent to prevent declarant from testifying).
33
THE PEOPLE’S ALMANAC 1358 (David Wallechinsky & Irving Wallace eds.,
1975). Webster’s offers this definition for the term “cant”: “The use of religious
phraseology without understanding or sincerity; empty, solemn speech, implying what
is
not
felt;
hypocrisy.”
Webster
Dictionary,
http://www.websterdictionary.net/d.aspx?w=cant (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
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their attention on facilitating the confrontation that Crawford
demands, rather than disputing the need for confrontation. 34

34

For strategies to allow more confrontation of hearsay declarants, see
Lininger, supra note 6, at 783-813. See also Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v.
Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 511, 591-614 (2005) (suggesting various strategies to facilitate confrontation
required by Crawford, including pretrial confrontation of hearsay declarants).

